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INTRODUCTION
What is the ultimate objective of the patent eligibility inquiry? Writing in 2012,
after Bilski 1 but before Mayo,2 Myriad,3 and Alice,4 Becky Eisenberg warned that if
this basic question remained unanswered, eligibility jurisprudence would continue
to be opaque.5 She examined the two objectives most commonly cited in blackletter eligibility law—that eligibility serves as a gatekeeper and curbs administrative
costs—and found both problematic.6
* Professor of Law; Associate Dean of Faculty, Emory University School of Law.
** Robert A. Lucas Chair of Law; Director, Center for Intellectual Property Research, Indiana
University Maurer School of Law.
1. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
2. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
3. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
4. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
5. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject Matter for
Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 41 (2012) (“[W]ithout
understanding what patentable subject matter boundaries are supposed to accomplish, it is difficult to
figure out where those boundaries belong.”).
6. Id. at 43–44. But cf. Maayan Perel, Reviving the Gatekeeping Function: Optimizing the Exclusion
Potential of Subject Matter Eligibility, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 237 (2013).
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Since that time, some things have gotten worse. The recent eligibility case
law—a frenzied outpouring of opinions from many esteemed judges—has revealed
little while mystifying much. Scholars haven’t fared much better, although it isn’t
for lack of trying. Our scholarly colleagues have offered a multitude of intriguing
new perspectives on the analysis—drawing on history,7 the philosophy of science,8
semiotics,9 institutional choice,10 and so on.11 They have attempted to simplify
eligibility by invoking complexity.12 They have summoned the ghosts of famous
thinkers, ranging from Burke13 to Veblen.14 Dan Burk has consulted Holmes.15
We have benefited greatly from this torrent of scholarship. And, besides that,
we have thoroughly imbibed Sir Arthur Conan Doyle and know that Holmes
(Sherlock, that is) invariably solves the puzzle in the end. But we share Eisenberg’s
concern, and we continue to wonder exactly what the eligibility inquiry is for.
In addressing that question here, we are following a familiar methodological
tradition: we propose to reimagine eligibility from another (yet another!) new
perspective, that of expressive theories of law. Our central claim is that eligibility
rules can be understood as performing expressive functions that are at least as
weighty, if not more so, than the traditional gatekeeping function. We argue that it
is helpful to identify those expressive functions for three reasons: (1) it helps explain
some aspects of eligibility doctrine that otherwise appear incoherent; (2) it brings to
the fore some new ideas about the objectives of the eligibility inquiry that link to
eligibility’s expressive functions; and (3) it may enable courts to design eligibility
rules that facilitate the development of new behavioral norms in the patent
community.

7. See, e.g., Christopher Beauchamp, Patenting Nature: A Problem of History, 16 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 101 (2013); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 565 (2015); Adam
Mossoff, Why History Matters in the Patentable Subject Matter Debate, 64 FLA. L. REV. FORUM 23, 25–26
(2012) (arguing that, historically, “courts treated patents liberally and expansively” because patents were
seen “as fundamental civil rights securing property rights in inventions”); Joshua D. Sarnoff, PatentEligible Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53 (2011); Ted Sichelman, Funk
Forward, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 361
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014).
8. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, The Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1279 (2014) (offering perspective on eligibility derived from theories of knowledge and technological
progress).
9. Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 IND. L.J.
1379 (2010).
10. John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041 (2011)
(focusing on the desirability of a greater institutional role for the PTO in eligibility).
11. Tun-Jen Chiang, Competing Visions of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1858,
1860 (2014) (contending that patentable subject matter “is often about non-economic moral values”).
12. Jacob S. Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (2014).
13. Edmund, not Dan. Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 855 (2007).
14. Austen Zuege, A New Theory for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility: A Veblenian Perspective, 5
CYBARIS 211 (2014).
15. Sherlock, not Oliver Wendell. Dan L. Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in Myriad
Genetics, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 505–06 (2014).
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We concede that offering yet one more perspective on the eligibility analysis
might not inject more clarity into the debate. On the other hand, maybe it will. So
we’re trying it.
In this Article we use expressive theories of law to examine and evaluate two
potential functions of modern patent eligibility doctrine. In Part I, we analyze the
role of eligibility rules as expression that shapes public perceptions about the
legitimacy of the patent grant. We show that some problematic eligibility rules may
be more readily explained when viewed as strategies for carrying out this expressive
function, and we suggest a new view of eligibility in which the doctrine may do very
little in the way of formal gatekeeping but may still remain robust because it does a
great deal of expressive work. In Part II, we offer one new way in which eligibility
rules might be harnessed to shape norms in the patent community—particularly,
claim-drafting norms. This flows from an observation that eligibility rules could be
understood as vehicles for expressing preferences about acceptable claiming
formats—and from an essentially contrarian position that eligibility rules should
facilitate the search for claiming strategies that avoid entanglements with ineligibility
issues.
I.

EXPRESSIVE ELIGIBILITY AND THE LEGITIMIZING FUNCTION

Patent eligibility can be understood to play a critical role that has little or
nothing to do with gatekeeping.16 Viewed as expressive law, patent eligibility rules
can be understood as a set of statements signaling that the patent grant is a politically
legitimate exercise of government power and that the Supreme Court is
appropriately situated as an institution to guide in regulating that power. We explore
these ideas below, first introducing expressive theories of law and then applying
those theories to patent eligibility rules.
A. Discerning Eligibility’s Expressive Component
1.

Expressive Theories of Law

law18

Scholars have debated expressive theories of constitutional law17 and criminal
quite extensively. Expressivist perspectives are beginning to penetrate areas of

16. For a contrary view that lionizes the gatekeeping function of eligibility analysis, see
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 718 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., concurring) (“Section
101 is the gateway to the Patent Act for good reason. It is the sentinel, charged with the duty of ensuring
that our nation’s patent laws encourage, rather than impede, scientific progress and technological
innovation.”).
17. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1531–64 (2000) (applying expressive theories to equal protection
and establishment clause cases, among others).
18. See, e.g., Gregory M. Gilchrist, Condemnation Without Basis: An Expressive Failure of Corporate
Prosecutions, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1121, 1127 (2013) (“Criminal law is distinctively expressive.”).
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private law,19 including patent law,20 although they have received far less attention
here.
Expressive theories of law proceed from the insight that legal rules function
not only to impose proscriptions or confer benefits, but also to communicate
messages on behalf of the State.21 While this insight, taken in isolation, is probably
trivial,22 the implications for the design and analysis of legal rules are more
substantial. The mere act of elucidating the messages that a legal rule conveys may
itself open up new arguments about how the rule should be tailored to achieve its
objectives—and might better illuminate what those objectives are. More robustly,
understanding a rule’s overlying message may be critical to assessing how the rule
shapes public perceptions, or, more ambitiously, how it shapes behavior. These
analytical steps, and the expressive theory that serves to organize them, are
particularly welcome in patent law, an area that all too often overindulges in
assumptions about rational actors responding predictably to incentives that the
patent doctrine purports to communicate with precision and clarity.23
2.

An Expressive Theory of Eligibility Rules

The law of patent eligibility is only superficially about the subject matter
categories that appear in § 101 of the statute.24 Most types of subject matter can be
claimed in a way that fits prima facie into one or more of the categories. As such,
19. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, The Expressive Synergies of the Volcker Rule, 54 B.C. L. REV. 469
(2013) (banking law); Carol M. Rose, Rhetoric and Romance: A Comment on Spouses and Strangers, 82 GEO.
L.J. 2409, 2410 (1994) (property law) (commenting on Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce
Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303 (1994)).
20. We have used expressive theories in prior work on patent law’s presumption of validity.
Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The “Dubious Preponderance,” 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
923 (2004); see also Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72
(2012) (examining one predicate to an expressive theory of patent law—namely, how patent doctrine
might be redesigned in view of the audience with which it communicates); Timothy R. Holbrook &
Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible Processes: An Audience Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349 (2015)
(extending the audience analysis to subject matter eligibility of process inventions). On the expressive
dimension of patent grants, see Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 573 (2006), and see also Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV.
1745 (2012), on assessing how expressive theories might be used to reorient traditional utilitymaximizing incentives across copyright and patent law.
21. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2051 (1996)
(explaining that a rule’s expressive function concerns “the statement that law makes”); see Corinne
Blalock, Hollingsworth v. Perry: Expressive Harm and the Stakes of “Marriage,” 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’ Y SIDEBAR 217, 240 (2013) (“Expressive theories of law begin with the baseline assertion
that a State’s actions convey meaning and express a point of view.”); see also RICHARD A. MCADAMS,
THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW 9 (2015) (arguing that law performs an expressive function by
providing information and coordination).
22. Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363,
1377 (2000) (asserting that “[t]he proposition that the meaning of governmental decisions has moral
import . . . is true, but quite banal,” and that expressivists “are surely making a more robust and
interesting claim than that”).
23. See, e.g., Janis & Holbrook, supra note 20, at 74–75 (making this point).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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courts have focused almost exclusively on the set of judicially-crafted exceptions.
The exceptions will also be our focal point in considering the extent to which
eligibility rules are expressive.
Courts began articulating exceptions from the eligibility provision ad hoc in
cases tracing back at least to the early twentieth century, if not earlier.25 In the
modern era, the Court has reified a particular list of judicial exceptions. As early as
its 1972 Benson decision,26 the Court began reciting a list of exceptions as if it
appeared explicitly on the face of § 101. The precise formulation has shifted slightly
over time. In Benson, the Court listed “[p]henomena of nature, . . . mental processes,
and abstract intellectual concepts” as excluded from § 101,27 whereas by 1981 (in
Chakrabarty) the Court’s incantation included “laws of nature, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas,”28 a list thereafter repeated in Bilski,29 Mayo,30 Myriad,31 and
Alice.32
By installing this list as the touchstone for eligibility analysis and declaring it
“well-established,”33 the Court has arrogated to the judiciary (and the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO)) vast discretionary powers over inputs to the patent
system—at least potentially.34 Indeed, as the Court recognized in Mayo, “all
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature,
natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,” such that an aggressive interpretation of the
exceptions “could eviscerate patent law.”35 As the PTO and the courts begin to
develop a case law applying Mayo and Alice, we are learning just how muscular the
exceptions have become.36 Over the longer term, if the jurisprudential tradition
25. See, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 7, at 63–69 (pointing to early American cases excluding newly
discovered scientific principles from patentability). But cf. Lefstin, supra note 7, at 15–29 (examining
British antecedents concerning the patentability of principles).
26. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
27. Id. at 67.
28. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
29. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 594 (2010).
30. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). The
Court also separately recited the list of exceptions as formulated in Benson, apparently viewing the two
formulations as synonymous. Id.
31. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013).
32. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
33. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116 (“We must apply this well-established standard to determine
whether Myriad’s patents claim any ‘new and useful . . . composition of matter,’ § 101, or instead claim
naturally occurring phenomena.”).
34. Potentially, because eligibility exceptions have traditionally been susceptible to
circumvention through claim drafting. See infra Part II; see also Mark D. Janis, Sustainable Agriculture, Patent
Rights, and Plant Innovation, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 91, 95–102 (2001) (noting the potential for
drafting around a proposed exclusion from § 101 for plants).
35. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293; see also Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (“[W]e tread carefully in
construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.”); Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116
(reiterating this cautionary limitation).
36. Indeed, Rebecca Eisenberg has suggested that the Court has pushed the exceptions quite
far in Alice, applying them not merely to prevent the patenting of fundamental tools, but also to exclude
inventions that are deemed trivially different from whatever subject matter is called basic or natural.
Rebecca Eisenberg, Symposium: Business Methods as “Abstract Ideas”—Explaining the Opacity of Alice and
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continues, we may be fumbling along case-by-case with a powerful indication that
the eligibility inquiry is doing something important, but only a vague notion about
what it might do next.
If we were engaged in a more traditional analysis, our next step would be to
dissect these exceptions to ascertain how they have operated as legal commands in
the many cases in which they have been invoked and to consider how they should
be juxtaposed with other doctrines of patentability.37 Our analysis here is different
in that it focuses on the rhetoric of the exceptions, and considers the extent to which
eligibility jurisprudence is an exercise in rhetoric management.
For us, then, the first analytical step is to examine and reflect on the
extraordinary rhetorical embellishments that the Court uses when it invokes its
litany of eligibility exceptions. For example, in Funk Bros., the Court characterized
the subject matter covered by the exceptions as “part of the storehouse of
knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”38 In
Benson, the Court averred that the excluded categories of subject matter constitute
“the basic tools of scientific and technological work,”39 a phrase that Justices
Stevens and Breyer both echoed in their concurring opinions in Bilski,40 and that

Bilski, SCOTUSBLOG ( June 23, 2014, 1:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposiumbusiness-methods-as-abstract-ideas-explaining-the-opacity-of-alice-and-bilski [http://perma.cc/5V2N
-QE3U]. In nearly all of its post-Alice decisions on eligibility, the Federal Circuit has agreed to strike
down the claims at issue as ineligible, often on the pleadings. Regarding the abstract idea exception, see
Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss based on ineligibility under § 101); buySAFE, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (same); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772
F.3d 709, 712 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (same); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d
1344, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming grant of summary judgment of ineligibility under § 101). But
cf. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (upholding claims against
a §101 eligibility challenge). Regarding the natural products exception, see In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh),
750 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014), affirming rejection of claims to cloned mammal as ineligible subject
matter under § 101. See also In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774
F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that claims to single-stranded DNA primers were ineligible under §
101 as natural products, and also holding that related method claims were ineligible under the abstract
idea exception). Of particular note is the controversial decision in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,
788 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015), which struck down claims to prenatal diagnostic methods that
used cell-free fetal DNA and asserted that the claims failed to define eligible subject matter even though
the invention may have been “a positive and valuable contribution to science.” The Federal Circuit
declined to rehear the case en banc. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
37. Indeed, we have done that recently ourselves. See Holbrook & Janis, supra note 20, at 377–
83.
38. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); see also Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010) (quoting this phrase).
39. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
40. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 649 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 658 (Breyer, J., concurring). Expanding
on this theme, Justice Breyer asserted that the Court had been “careful in interpreting the Patent Act
to ‘determine not only what is protected, but also what is free for all to use.’” Id. (quoting Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)).
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the Court reiterated in Mayo,41 Myriad,42 and Alice.43 In Chakrabarty, the Court tied
this language to a set of hypotheticals that have now become central elements of
the eligibility canon:
[A] new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is
not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his
celebrated law that E=mc 2; nor could Newton have patented the law of
gravity. Such discoveries are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men
and reserved exclusively to none.”44
It might seem tempting to dismiss these passages as grandiose speechifying,
adding relatively little to the law’s doctrinal algorithm and offering virtually no
guidance as to the outcomes of individual cases. Indeed, when viewed as elements
of traditional black-letter legal doctrine, these passages merely obfuscate and
frustrate, to the extent that they have any force at all. They provide a background
for decision-making rather than a formula for it and seem crafted to appeal mainly
to intuition and emotion.
But this is just the point of an expressive analysis of eligibility. The utility of
the expressive perspective is that it calls for an analysis that takes the rhetoric of
eligibility seriously and seeks to discern the messages that the eligibility exceptions
convey about the patent system, rather than setting aside the language and probing
for the scope of the particular substantive proscriptions that the exceptions
embody. As Professors Anderson and Pildes put it, speaking of the expressive
dimension of constitutional law, “expressive rationales do not depend on complex
calculations of effects in particular cases.”45 While expressive law is still
consequentialist, “[t]he way the law seeks to realize these consequences is not in a
direct manner through some case-by-case instrumental calculation, but rather
indirectly,” by shaping perceptions.46
The expressive perspective opens up a fresh line of inquiry into the purposes
of the eligibility inquiry, one that turns on understanding the effect of eligibility
rhetoric on public perceptions of the patent grant, and not so much on
understanding the eligibility inquiry as an algorithm for yielding particular legal
outcomes. We explore this connection between eligibility rhetoric and public
perception in the following subsections.
B. Expressive Eligibility and Legitimacy
The litany of eligibility exceptions performs an expressive function in addition
to performing its more conventional doctrinal function. The exceptions express the

41. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
42. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013).
43. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
44. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)); see also Mayo, 133 S. Ct. at 1293 (reiterating these passages).
45. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 17, at 1561.
46. Id.
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message that the patent system’s reach has some outer, theoretical bounds. Quite
apart from the role of the exceptions in driving outcomes in particular cases, the
Court may invoke the exceptions for the purpose of calling attention to the
proposition that the patent system’s reach is not all-encompassing—a rhetorical
strategy that may be useful in assuring the public that the patent system as a whole
is a legitimate exercise of governmental power.
To elaborate, we are arguing that the language of the exceptions conveys a
message to the general public that not everything is eligible for patent protection.47
Symbolic hypotheticals that litter the Court’s modern eligibility opinions concretize
this message: minerals dug up from the ground, plants returned from the wild,
marine fauna discovered in the ocean depths, Einstein’s theory of relativity
expressed in the iconic equation—all will remain forever unencumbered by
patents.48
Moreover, this message can be conveyed quite effectively even when the
precise contours of each individual exception remain unclear. Consider the naturalproducts exception at issue in Myriad. The rhetoric has instantaneous, intuitive
appeal. Anyone can understand, and reflexively support, the proposition that
“nature is off-limits” to patent protection. Indeed, some of the public’s visceral
reaction to the patenting of human genes may be explained by this dynamic: the
fear of the propertization of naturally occurring items, particularly those that a
layperson might consider to be in their body. Moreover, the natural-products
exception is supremely malleable and thoroughly opaque. The Court can invoke it
as a simple article of faith without necessarily making explicit the values that drive
the outcome of the case. The Court can get by with unvarnished tautologies—saying
unabashedly, for example, that one can determine whether a claim is directed to a
natural product by assessing whether it is “nature’s handiwork.”49 Viewed in this
way, the natural-products exception is more “show horse” than “work horse,” to
borrow from another scholar’s metaphors.50
47. Cf. Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591 (2008). But cf. Michael Risch,
Nothing is Patentable, 67 FLA. L. REV. FORUM 45 (2015).
48. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293 (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309). Of course, we have no
monopoly on characterizing the expressive content of eligibility rules. Others may perceive other
messages, and have. See, e.g., Jonah D. Jackson, Note, Something Like the Sun: Why Even “Isolated and
Purified” Genes are Still Products of Nature, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1453, 1467 (2011) (asserting that the Court’s
“storehouse of knowledge” trope is an implicit expression of “[t]he concern for democratic ideals” such
as “freedom of information, human dignity, and the effective functioning of society”). We are simply
arguing that the message that we discern is a plausible one, and that examining it is an exercise worth
undertaking because it illuminates aspects of eligibility jurisprudence in a new way.
49. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309; see also Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131 (“handiwork of nature”).
50. Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1011, 1046 (2007). As Wells explains it in the context of the Court’s constitutional cases:
When Supreme Court opinions in hard cases are written with an eye toward satisfying the
audience’s expectations, the arguments the Court deploys can fairly be characterized as
“show horses,” decorating the opinions while doing little or none of the work of deciding
the case. Meanwhile, constitutional values are the “work horses” that determine who wins
and why, but get little attention in many of the opinions.
Id.
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These qualities that make the natural-products exception so attractive when
deployed expressively are the very qualities that make that exception endlessly
frustrating when recast as a conventional gatekeeping doctrine. It is too shapeless
to serve as the foundation for any well-elucidated, granular set of rules on eligibility
for living subject matter. It is too unpredictable, too discretionary, too likely to
crowd into other patentability doctrines whose contours are at least a little more
sharply defined. But it is more coherent descriptively when viewed as the expression
of a simple (or deceptively simple) principle. The examples that the Court trots out
to support the exceptions are the “easy” cases—ones that resonate with the general
public.51 But they are poor guideposts and tell us virtually nothing as to what subject
matter should fall within or without the patent system. We thus are not defending
the exception on normative grounds, but we are suggesting that the exception can
be understood in a new light when its expressive component is considered.
The expressive perspective on eligibility might also throw some light on
Myriad ’s seemingly dubious distinction between gDNA and cDNA claims in the
eligibility analysis. The Court’s gDNA/cDNA distinction has been called
incoherent with ample justification.52 Indeed, we are skeptical that the distinction
holds up if viewed in traditional doctrinal terms as a way of attempting to fine-tune
the natural-products exception. Instead, the distinction looks more like the product
of compromise, conveniently advanced in the Solicitor General’s brief and happily
grasped by the Court.53 Arriving at a decision that creates the perception of
moderation—of compromise—serves the Court’s purpose in legitimizing patent
law, and, indeed, in legitimizing the Court’s institutional role in the patent system,54
at least among audiences which are unlikely to attempt to deconstruct the
gDNA/cDNA distinction as a matter of molecular biology. That is, the Court’s
move may be more easily explained as an exercise in managing the message
conveyed by the natural-products exception, and more broadly, as reflecting a
judgment about how best to deflect general public criticism about the intrusiveness
of the patent right.55
The expressivist perspective provides another argument: excluding subject
matter by a categorical label could deliver a powerful message about the system’s
aspirations, and this might be true even if the precise parameters of the excluded
category remain ambiguous.56 In particular, the debate over excluding “business
51. Id. at 1027.
52. Burk, supra note 15, at 507.
53. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 12, Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398).
54. See infra Section I.C for more on institutional legitimacy.
55. The Court’s judgment may be completely wrong, of course. And we are not suggesting that
eligibility’s only role is expressive.
56. Again, this is not a normative argument. Indeed, neither of us supports a categorical
exclusion from eligibility for business methods, because we believe that the administrative costs of such
a rule would be substantial. But we do believe that framing the eligibility question as partly expressive
opens up a coherent argument in favor of a categorical exclusion for those who are otherwise
proponents of it.

Janis_production read v3 (clean) (Do Not Delete)

982

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

3/13/2016 6:54 PM

[Vol. 5:973

methods” from patent eligibility provides another example in which expressive
eligibility might be illuminating descriptively. The Court has dallied with, although
never quite accepted, a categorical subject matter exclusion for claims to “business
methods.”57 A common argument against a categorical exclusion is that it would
place pressure on the definition of “business method.”58 An ex ante legislative
definition would no doubt quickly be proven defective given the rapid advance of
information technology, and leaving the parameters to be defined in individual cases
by judges and the PTO would be likely to put us about where we are now with
eligibility jurisprudence—splitting hairs over what is “technology” and what is mere
“business,” for example.59
As the foregoing examples suggest, we are also arguing that once the litany of
eligibility exceptions is understood to have an expressive component, we can
reconsider the nagging question of the eligibility inquiry’s ultimate purposes. In
particular, one important expressive purpose of the eligibility inquiry is to provide
a mechanism by which the Court can show that patent law is substantively
legitimate. That is, the categories of eligible subject matter articulated on the face of
§ 101 seem to be limitless,60 and if (we speculate) this is contrary to ordinary
intuition, the statute is likely to trigger questions about the legitimacy of the body
of patent law as a whole. Against this pressure, the litany of judicially-crafted
exceptions to eligibility operates as a key political safety valve, realigning the law
with the ordinary person’s intuitions (again, we speculate) and thus serving a critical
legitimizing function.
At times during the Supreme Court’s long and checkered history with patent
law, the political imperative for such a legitimizing function may well have been
acute. Consider the Court’s periodic bouts of antipathy toward patents generally,
perhaps reflecting a judicial response to the perception that the public was (at times)
fed up with the exercise of apparent monopoly-like power.61 In such an

57. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 606–08 (2010) (declining to adopt a categorical exclusion
for business methods). But cf. id. at 614 (Stevens, J., concurring) (advocating a categorical exclusion); see
also Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(citing the Stevens approach with approval). One nevertheless may wonder whether Alice Corp. has
resulted in a de facto categorical exclusion.
58. Holbrook & Janis, supra note 20, at 357.
59. Id.
60. Especially if the snippet of legislative history quoted in Chakrabarty—the notorious
“anything under the sun that is made by man” quote—is cited selectively, without an examination of
context. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952))
(suggesting that Congress intended § 101 to encompass “anything under the sun that is made by man”);
see also H.R. Rep. No. 92-1923, at 6 (1952); cf. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 642 (Stevens, J., concurring) (pointing
out that “the full sentence in the Committee Report reads: ‘A person may have “invented” a machine
or a manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not
necessarily patentable under § 101 unless the conditions of [this] title are fulfilled.’”)
61. Deepsouth Packing Co. Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972) (“Moreover, we
must consider petitioner’s claim in light of this Nation’s historical antipathy to monopoly and of
repeated congressional efforts to preserve and foster competition.” (citation omitted)); see also Dawson
Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 223 (1980) (White, J., dissenting). But see Timothy R.
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environment, the apparently unbridled language of § 101 is politically unpalatable,
and so the judicial exceptions can be used for crucial expressive work. For example,
they might be recited to signal that the Court will retain power to strike down
patents that threaten widespread anticompetitive consequences. The significance
lies in the mere articulation of the exceptions, establishing that the Court has the
power to act, even if it does not exercise that power in the particular case in which
the exceptions are recited.
Our argument, and the concepts embedded in it, warrant fuller explanation,
and can be placed in a broader theoretical framework. First, we think that it is a key
insight that the expressive aspects of patent law rules connect to public perceptions
of the patent system’s legitimacy. The idea of a connection between expressive law
and legitimacy has previously been explored in other settings. One scholar puts it in
straightforward terms: “People make judgments about a legal system’s legitimacy
based on what they perceive to be the expression inherent in various legal actions.”62
This is peculiarly true of a specialized (perhaps arcane) field like patent law. Legal
pronouncements—and the messages that they are perceived to convey—take on
special significance in the patent system. The generalist does not bring to patent law
a developed set of applicable background norms or a range of intuitions drawn from
everyday experience.63
Second, the notion of legitimacy that we are invoking here is more robust than
common usage of the term may imply. We are speaking of what has been variously
called descriptive, empirical, or sociological legitimacy.64 Sociological legitimacy
“refers to the political acceptability of law—its power to command voluntary
compliance.”65 Put another way, a legal regime possesses sociological legitimacy
when “the relevant public regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving
of support for reasons beyond fear of sanctions or mere hope for personal
reward.”66 Sociological legitimacy may be distinguished from normative or moral
legitimacy, which “refers to qualities that make the law morally worthy of assent.”67

Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing Patent Infringement for Offering to Sell an Invention and
Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751,
764 (2003) (“The history of § 271 demonstrates that, contrary to the Supreme Court’s historical
antipathy to patents, Congress has taken an expansive view of them, enlarging the class of activities
covered by the patent statute’s forms of infringement.”)
62. Gilchrist, supra note 18, at 1127–28.
63. Janis & Holbrook, supra note 20, at 78.
64. See, e.g., Or Bassok, The Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty, 26 J.L. & POL. 239, 242–43 (2011)
(addressing descriptive institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court).
65. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 884 (2009).
66. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795 (2005).
67. Id. at 1797–1800; Kahan et al., supra note 65, at 884. Fallon also identifies a third category—
“legal” legitimacy, referring to the proposition that an act may draw its legitimacy from the fact that it
is lawful. Fallon, Jr., supra note 66.
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It also may be distinguished from “legal” legitimacy, a reference to legitimacy that
derives from the binding power of law.68
More particularly, we mean to refer here to the sociological legitimacy of the
substantive content of the patent law—as distinguished from institutional
legitimacy, which we discuss separately.69 Patent eligibility plays a role here that is
matched by few other doctrines, and the Myriad case is a powerful illustration. Due
in no small part to the language chosen for the certiorari question,70 Myriad came
into the public consciousness as a case about whether the patent system extended
to human genes. Unlike the general run of patent cases, Myriad literally sent
protestors into the streets with picket signs.71 There can be little doubt that a
certiorari question with such profound overtones is tantamount to a challenge to
the patent system as a whole to justify itself in the public mind.72 Presumably this is
exactly what the petitioners intended. Accordingly, we think that it is reasonable to
suggest that, at least in the context of Myriad, public perceptions of systemic
legitimacy truly were at stake.
We take a similar lesson from the rhetoric of the appellate decision in the
Myriad litigation in Australia.73 Toward the end of its opinion, the appellate court
took great pains to announce that it was not deciding a case about the bona fides
of the patent system as a whole:
This case is not about the wisdom of the patent system. It is about the
application of Australian patent law, as set out in the Act and as developed
by the courts since the Statute of Monopolies.74
This language persuades us of just the opposite: that the case did, in fact, implicate
the legitimacy of the patent system, if for no other reason than the court’s own
pronouncement. The disclaimer actually confirms our intuition by drawing the
68. Fallon, Jr., supra note 66. A decision can be legally legitimate but lack authoritative
sociological legitimacy. See id. at 1848 (“Laws barring alcohol during Prohibition were legally legitimate,”
but not necessarily sociologically legitimate.).
69. See infra Section I.C.
70. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398) (presenting the question “Are human genes patentable?” as
Question 1); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012)
(granting the petition “limited to Question 1 presented by the petition”).
71. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Intellectual Property Rights Gone Wild, SLATE (May 12, 2013, 7:00
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/project_syndicate/2013/05/gene_patents_the_case
_of_myriad_genetics_shows_the_dangers_of_overly_protecting.html [http://perma.cc/DRX7-EYY2]
(providing commentary along with a photo of a gene patenting protest outside the Supreme Court
building).
72. Quite in contrast to other patent cases that may present little to fire the public imagination
even if they are monumental within the patent community. Thus, we would be less apt to suggest that
a question about the correct verbal formulation for the indefiniteness standard implicates core
questions about the substantive sociological legitimacy of the patent system. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014). We might argue likewise with regard to the question of
whether claim interpretation should be reviewed de novo. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 831 (2015).
73. See generally D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc [2014] FCAFC 115, ¶ 204 (Austl.).
74. Id. The High Court of Australia reversed. D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc [2015] HCA 35.
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public’s attention to the issue at hand and simultaneously discounting its
importance. But if legitimacy were not at stake, then there would be no need to flag
the issue.
Third, we recognize that our argument tying eligibility rules to sociological
legitimacy elides many complexities. Our argument rests in part on an empirical
assumption—namely that the public would be likely to dismiss as illegitimate a
patent system that purported to encompass all conceivable subject matter. We have
not tested this assumption, nor have others, to our knowledge.75 And while it would
be hyperbolical to suggest that the patent system would collapse if the courts
extended patent eligibility to, say, cloned mammals or newly discovered biological
material, uncomfortable questions about the fundamental legitimacy of the patent
system have periodically surfaced in the political discourse for nearly as long as the
patent system has existed.76 They continue to be bandied about today.77
We also recognize that the relevant public whose perceptions are being
assessed in any inquiry into sociological legitimacy is not necessarily monolithic.78
What one group deems legitimate (sociologically), another may not. But this
proposition is broadly true,79 and yet scholars have nevertheless found the
sociological legitimacy inquiry to be useful in other areas. Likewise, patent law
inquiries such as eligibility may benefit from the inquiry.

75. Cf. Gregory N. Mandel, The Public Perception of Intellectual Property, 66 FLA. L. REV. 261 (2014).
Mandel’s experiment initiates a broad-based inquiry into the public’s views toward various aspects of
intellectual property law, but does not test public perceptions relating to patent-eligible subject matter.
Id. at 278–86.
76. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899 (2002) (analyzing
nineteenth century movements to abolish the patent system).
77. See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank
of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-035A, 2012), http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012035.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BX3-6ZR5?type=pdf]. See generally MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K.
LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008). Although beyond the scope of this Article and
this symposium, critiques leveled against patent assertion entities (“PAEs”), pejoratively known as trolls,
also harken to concerns about the patent system’s legitimacy: if, as it is argued, the patent system simply
reflects a transfer of wealth and does little to incentivize (and indeed may inhibit) innovation, then the
system would be viewed as highly questionable. We do not share those broad concerns, though we note
that PAEs may be symptomatic of other issues in the patent system. See Timothy Holbrook, Not All
Patent Trolls Are Demons, CNN (Feb. 21, 2014, 9:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/21/opinion/
holbrook-patent-trolls-demons [http://perma.cc/KMV3-HHJG].
78. Elsewhere, we have explored at length the idea that the relevant audience for any given
patent law pronouncement is a construct that may be defined in ways that reflect complex interactions
among a network of individual and institutional participants in the patent community. See Janis &
Holbrook, supra note 20, at 84–89. The perceived content of the message that is expressed by a patent
law rule, and the likelihood of discerning one message as opposed to others, are functions of the
definition of the relevant audience. See generally id. For the eligibility exceptions, as for other patent rules,
reasonable minds could differ as to the message that the exceptions convey, and as to the dynamics of
transmission of that message through the audiences that might be affected.
79. Fallon, Jr., supra note 66, at 1796.
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C. Expressive Eligibility and the Supreme Court’s Institutional Legitimacy in Patent Law
Eligibility rules may also have another expressive function: they may affect
perceptions of the Court’s institutional legitimacy as a decision-maker in the patent
system.80 The natural-products exception, and its role in the Myriad case in
particular, is perhaps the most vivid modern illustration of a patent dispute that puts
the Court’s perceived institutional legitimacy in play.
Scholars who have studied the jurisprudential concept of legitimacy have
distinguished between substantive and institutional species of sociological
legitimacy. Fallon characterizes the Court’s institutional legitimacy as residing in
“public beliefs that it is a generally trustworthy decisionmaker whose rulings
therefore deserve respect or obedience.”81 Wells presses this concept further,
asserting that the hard cases that regularly appear on the Court’s docket are the very
ones that so profoundly implicate the Court’s need to preserve its sociological
legitimacy as an institution.82 That is, given the Court’s “vital institutional need for
public confidence,”83 the Court is under intense pressure to put “an attractive face
on its rulings.”84 Accordingly, it is argued, the Court’s opinions may reflect a
systematic bias in favor of rhetoric that operates primarily for the purpose of
building public trust.85
We leave for others to debate whether appearance management is a salient
feature of Supreme Court jurisprudence generally and to assess its normative
implications across wide swaths of law. We are focusing specifically on patent law,
an area in which the Supreme Court sits in review of a unique appellate court of
specialized subject matter jurisdiction. This institutional arrangement poses an
ongoing dilemma for the Supreme Court.86 If the Court absents itself from patent
law by systematically denying certiorari in appeals from the Federal Circuit, the
Court may dilute its own legitimacy (and perhaps even its competency) as an
institutional actor in the system.87 If the Court intervenes routinely in substantive
patent law matters, the Court may likewise impair its legitimacy by creating a

80. For another institutional perspective on patent eligibility, see Golden, supra note 10, at 1111,
which concludes that the PTO is best situated to advance the goals of the eligibility inquiry via its
administrative rulemaking authority.
81. Fallon, Jr., supra note 66, at 1828.
82. Wells, supra note 50, at 1020 (asserting that decisions presenting a conflict between legal and
sociological legitimacy are most likely to be perceived as “thorny” issues worthy of Supreme Court
review).
83. Id. at 1014 (speaking of the Court’s constitutional rulings).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1027.
86. A matter that has been heavily studied in recent years. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court—and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 793–97
(2010); John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of
Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657 (2009).
87. Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387,
401–06 (2001) (outlining the institutional issues that may arise when the Supreme Court absents itself
from the development of substantive patent law).
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perception that it is determined to substitute its own views for those of the Federal
Circuit, a court that Congress designed as the repository of substantive patent law
expertise.88 In Myriad, Justice Scalia’s remarkable concurrence—remarkable in that
Justice Scalia unapologetically disclaimed any deep understanding of the facts of the
case89—illustrates the inherent tension in a system that calls for generalist Supreme
Court review of Federal Circuit patent law matters.
The Court does view its role as a generalist as an important check on the
potential biases of an expert court, or at least some justices do. Justice Stevens made
his views explicit in his concurrence in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Systems, Inc., where he noted that “[a]n occasional conflict in decisions may be useful
in identifying questions that merit this Court’s attention. Moreover, occasional
decisions by courts with broader jurisdiction will provide an antidote to the risk that
the specialized court may develop an institutional bias.”90 Justice Breyer articulated
similar concerns in his dissent to the dismissal of Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings
v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.91 According to Justice Breyer, “a decision from this
generalist Court could contribute to the important ongoing debate, among both
specialists and generalists, as to whether the patent system, as currently administered
and enforced, adequately reflects the ‘careful balance’ that ‘the federal patent
laws . . . embod[y].’”92
Compared to other areas of law that fall under the Court’s review powers,
patent law may present the Court with an especially difficult task of appearance
management. And, therefore, in deciding patent cases, the Court may experience a
particularly acute need to use rhetorical tools that make it easy to frame opinions
and justify case outcomes in a manner that instills public confidence in the Court’s
work. Moreover, conspicuously, many of the Supreme Court’s recent patent law
decisions have been unanimous, even in the face of vigorous disagreement and
argument at the Federal Circuit. Such unanimity (at times paired with less than
illuminating language) may suggest that the Supreme Court is quite aware of this
dynamic. It needs to speak with a unanimous voice in order to counter the expert
Federal Circuit. The natural-products exception fills this need well when
understood as a predominantly expressive rule, for many of the reasons discussed
in the preceding subsection.
Understanding the eligibility exceptions as largely expressive may also help
rationalize (although not justify) the textualist quandary in modern Supreme Court
88. Id. at 394–401 (identifying concerns with Supreme Court interventionism).
89. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part) (“I join the judgment of the Court, and all of its opinion except Part I-A and
some portions of the rest of the opinion going into fine details of molecular biology. I am unable to
affirm those details on my own knowledge or even my own belief.”).
90. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 839 (2002) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
91. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006).
92. Id. at 137 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146
(1989)).
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patent opinions concerning § 101. The eligibility exceptions are judicially crafted,
but yet even the Court’s most committed textualists have unflinchingly endorsed
them, or at least perpetuated them. As at least one scholar has noted, this would
seem to call for some explaining.93 To date, however, the Court has mainly
dissembled. In Bilski, Justice Kennedy conceded that the exceptions “are not
required by the statutory text,” but nonetheless claimed that they “are consistent
with the notion that a patentable process must be ‘new and useful.’”94 Perhaps
sensing the clumsiness of this sleight-of-hand, Justice Kennedy fell back on stare
decisis, asserting that “in any case, these exceptions have defined the reach of the
statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.”95 In succeeding
cases, the Court has briskly invoked stare decisis and moved on.96 It is striking, as
Rebecca Eisenberg has suggested, that the Court has “revive[d] previously
moribund limitations on patentable subject matter” without questioning the
efficacy of its prior precedent,97 as if the Court’s previous decisions are inviolate.
If the judicial exceptions actually constitute the expressive centerpiece of
eligibility doctrine, these maneuvers may be a bit easier to explain. Committed
textualists might complain that the exceptions are furtive derogations from the
statutory language, but expressivists could assert that the exceptions are essential to
ensuring that the patent system is perceived to have some theoretical outer
boundaries and that the Court is equipped to define those boundaries.
D. Eligibility Rules as (Expressively) Aspirational
A view of eligibility exceptions as predominantly expression opens up another
line of inquiry that warrants exploring. It concerns the question of the degree to
which eligibility exceptions are actually enforced—that is, whether they are actually
used as a basis for denying eligibility in a substantial number of cases. This has

93. John Duffy, Opinion Analysis: The Uncertain Expansion of Judge-Made Exceptions to
Patentability, SCOTUSBLOG ( Jun. 20, 2014, 12:46 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/
opinion-analysis-the-uncertain-expansion-of-judge-made-exceptions-to-patentability [http://perma
.cc/63F7-YPXA] (“It is an ongoing mystery as to why the textualist Justices have been so willing to
interpret these judge-made exceptions liberally and expansively.”).
94. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601–02 (2010).
95. Id.; see also Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised
Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring,
63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1300 (2011) (“[The Court’s language] blithely sweep[s] the fundamental
interpretive problem of patentable subject matter—what grounds and guides the contours of the
exclusions—under the rug.”).
96. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (“We have
interpreted §101 and its predecessors in light of this exception for more than 150 years.”); Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (“We have long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas are not patentable.”); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1293 (2012) (“The Court has long held that this provision contains an important implicit
exception.”); Bilski, 561 U.S. at 601–02; O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (1 How.) 62, 112–20 (1854); Le Roy
v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (1 How.) 156, 174–75 (1853)).
97. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 7.
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become a critical matter in the immediate wake of Alice, given that the initial wave
of cases applying the Alice framework has demonstrated that the abstract idea
exception has substantially more than mere rhetorical force.98 In contrast, some
other judges deciding cases before Alice had treated eligibility as a mere “coarse
filter.”99 The “coarse filter” view has been criticized for appearing to relegate
eligibility to a bit part in the regime of patentability rules, while the opposing view
(“eligibility-as-king”) has been disparaged as supplanting other patentability
doctrines that are better suited for aligning the patentability decision with the goals
of the patent system.100
The expressive perspective on the eligibility inquiry affords a fresh look at
these positions. In particular, it paves the way for a coherent argument that the
eligibility exceptions can simultaneously be vital and weak. In theory, the litany of
eligibility exceptions can still carry out its expressive function—at least for a time—
even if the expressed message is largely aspirational. To press the argument even
further, even if the language of the eligibility exceptions is purely symbolic, and the
iconic hypothetical cases in which the exceptions are triggered really are mere
hypotheticals, the eligibility exceptions could still be performing crucial expressive
work. In particular, the exceptions could still be effective in reassuring observers
that patent law has boundaries, even if those boundaries are not traversed in
particular cases that come before the Court.
For example, consider the following counterfactual: suppose that the Court
had upheld all of the isolated gDNA claims as patent-eligible in Myriad, in addition
to confirming the eligibility of the isolated cDNA claims. Would such an outcome
inevitably have signaled the death of eligibility doctrine as a meaningful gatekeeper
and the triumph of the coarse filter view? Surely the answer is no. The Court is
sufficiently sophisticated to recognize that it need not frame its eligibility decisions
in such starkly reductionist terms, especially if the Court is sensitive to the expressive
dimension of its eligibility rules. Or, stated differently, there surely were mechanisms
that the Court might have used in order to write an opinion that achieved adequate
public acceptance while upholding all of the claims at issue as patent-eligible. The
Court could have endorsed the vitality of the natural-products exception with its
customary vigor, but relied on the longstanding use of the term “isolated” as a term
of art in claims to justify an eligibility ruling.101 It could have upheld eligibility but
signaled that it expected that the issue of patentability over the prior art would be
contested on remand. It could have emphasized the case-specific nature of the
eligibility inquiry. In this hypothetical version of Myriad, or indeed in any case
upholding eligibility, the Court’s litany of eligibility exceptions may be seen as

98. See cases cited supra note 36.
99. See, e.g., Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
100. See Holbrook & Janis, supra note 20, at 352–58 (analyzing these two competing schools of
thought).
101. See infra Part II (exploring this prospect).
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especially critical expressively, tempering the decision by symbolizing the Court’s
recognition that the range of eligible subject matter is not infinite.102
We think that this account of eligibility exceptions as expressively
aspirational—as rarely implicated but yet still expressively vital—is useful in part
because it is so far removed from traditional accounts. Eligibility doctrine need not
be robustly restrictive (in the sense of excluding wide swaths of subject matter) in
order to be important. Eligibility doctrine can serve important purposes other than
resolving intractable gatekeeping questions.
We recognize the limits to this proposition. It is one thing to argue, as we do,
that an expressive rule need not be coupled tightly to enforcement activity. It is
more ambitious to suggest that an expressive rule can maintain its expressive
function effectively without any prospect of enforcement. Uneven enforcement can
erode the credibility of the message over time, as one scholar has recently pointed
out in studying the law relating to hate crimes.103 But there are hosts of laws that
are rarely enforced yet help send expressive messages about appropriate conduct
and norms. Even if they are not enforced, that communication can provide
normative and persuasive weight to those trying to adjust behavior.104
The eligibility inquiry could also be reframed in these terms. In the next Part,
we elaborate on this more nuanced approach to expressivism—that rules can be
useful, even if rarely invoked, to help norms develop in response to the rule.
II. EXPRESSIVE ELIGIBILITY AND THE ANTIFORMALIST COROLLARY
The preceding Part presents a relatively modest notion of expressive law: one
that focuses on a rule’s symbolism and judicial strategies for using that symbolism
to enhance the law’s legitimacy (or the Court’s). A more ambitious view of
expressive law contemplates that a rule’s message may provide a focal point around
which new norms of behavior can emerge.105 In this Part, we argue that the Court
102. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), itself may illustrate this point.
103. But cf. Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858 (2014) (arguing that
hate crime legislation is a paradigmatic example of expressive law, but that prosecutors’ enforcement
decisions can significantly undercut the legislative message).
104. Consider, for example, antilittering laws or regulations designed to protect bicycle riders.
These are meaningful even in the absence of a comprehensive, effective enforcement apparatus.
Regulations regarding texting while driving might at some point prove to be another example.
105. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1651–
53 (2000). For example, the mere statement of a judicial preference might nudge an existing norm aside,
creating space for “norms entrepreneurs” to establish a new norm. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 2030–31;
see also Sandeep Gopalan, Changing Social Norms and CEO Pay: The Role of Norms Entrepreneurs, 39
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 30–34 (2007) (synthesizing the literature on norms entrepreneurs); Cass R. Sunstein,
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996) (exploring the concept). Even if the
judicial statement lacks the power to compel compliance, its existence alone may embolden advocates
to urge others to conform their practices to the desired norm. In this way, expressive law may generate
change even in the absence of a direct coercive effect. This, of course, is a vision of expressive law at
its most robust, with aspirations going well beyond mere symbolism. See Fromer, supra note 20, at 1781–
89 (exploring the strong form of expressive law and using it to demonstrate the value of expressive
incentives in intellectual property law).
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could reorient the eligibility inquiry to function as a platform for facilitating patent
claim-drafting norms. To do so, the Court first would need to discard the view that
patent eligibility rules must be constructed so as to thwart circumvention on the
part of patent drafters. We refer to this view as eligibility’s antiformalist corollary.
A. The Origin and Ascendancy of the Antiformalist Corollary in Eligibility Law
Modern eligibility jurisprudence in the United States includes an oft-repeated
antiformalist corollary: eligibility rules should not turn on the format of the claims,
because if they do, they will be susceptible to easy circumvention thanks to the
efforts of skilled patent claim drafters. Although often invoked as a hedge against
eligibility standards that are perceived to be too generous, the antiformalist stance
is more pervasive than that. Judges who support stringent eligibility rules, along with
several who adamantly oppose those rules, have unfurled the antiformalist banner,
making it one of the few aspects of modern eligibility jurisprudence that garners
universal approbation.106
The Federal Circuit eligibility cases expressing the antiformalist view tend to
trace it back to a dissent by Judge Rich—no proponent of high thresholds for
eligibility. In Chatfield, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reviewed a § 101
rejection of claims to a computer-implemented method that purportedly enhanced
the operating efficiency of computer systems.107 The court ruled 3–2 to reverse the
rejection, concluding that the method claims did not preempt all uses of the
underlying algorithm and that Benson established a rule of preemption, not a
proscription against all computer-implemented process claims.108 Although he was
surely no fan of Benson, Judge Rich argued that Benson reached farther. In Judge
Rich’s view, an applicant could not avoid Benson merely by recasting claims from
process to machine format because “it is merely a drafter’s choice.”109 The full court
soon adopted Judge Rich’s perspective. As the court explained,
Judge Rich stated in his dissent that Benson applies equally whether an
invention is claimed as an apparatus or process, because the form of the
claim is often an exercise in drafting. This viewpoint was adopted by this
entire Court in In re Freeman, supra, 573 F.2d 1237, 1247 (C.C.P.A. 1978).110
In In re Maucorps, Judge Markey quoted this language and asserted that “[l]abels are
not determinative in § 101 inquiries.”111
106. Naturally, having identified this rare instance of consensus in eligibility jurisprudence,
we’re choosing to argue that both sides have it wrong.
107. In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 153–54 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
108. Id. at 155–56.
109. Id. at 161 (Rich, J., dissenting). Simultaneously, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
had decided a similar case involving apparatus claims. See In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
110. In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070, 1077 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (citation omitted).
111. In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A. 1979). Eventually, in State Street Bank, Judge
Rich converted this logic into a justification for an expansive eligibility standard: “The question of
whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter should not focus on which of the four categories
of subject matter a claim is directed to—process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter—
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The Supreme Court has put the proposition more bluntly. In Flook, the Court
scoffed at the applicant’s effort to save the eligibility of the process claim by
appending “post-solution activity.”112 The applicant’s notion “exalts form over
substance,” according to the Court, and should be rejected because it invited
applicants to indulge in a drafting game:
A competent draftsman could attach some form of post-solution activity
to almost any mathematical formula; the Pythagorean theorem would not
have been patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent application
contained a final step indicating that the formula, when solved, could be
usefully applied to existing surveying techniques. The concept of
patentable subject matter under § 101 is not “like a nose of wax which may
be turned and twisted in any direction . . . .”113
The Court returned to this theme later in its Flook opinion:
First, respondent incorrectly assumes that if a process application
implements a principle in some specific fashion, it automatically falls
within the patentable subject matter of § 101 and the substantive
patentability of the particular process can then be determined by the
conditions of §§ 102 and 103. This assumption is based on respondent’s
narrow reading of Benson, and is as untenable in the context of § 101 as it
is in the context of that case. It would make the determination of
patentable subject matter depend simply on the draftsman’s art and would
ill serve the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for
“ideas” or phenomena of nature.114
And the Court invoked similar rhetoric in upholding eligibility in Diehr.115
In modern eligibility decisions at both the Federal Circuit116 and the Supreme

but rather on the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility.” State
St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (footnote
omitted), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
112. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
113. Id. (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886) (the famous “nose of wax” case)).
The Court’s professed aversion to manipulating claim language, evidenced by its invocation of White, is
particularly ironic. Flook adopts an eligibility analysis that takes liberties with the language of the claim,
dissecting it to examine the inventiveness of its individual components.
114. Flook, 437 U.S. at 593.
115. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981) (dismissing eligibility rules that would
“allow a competent draftsman to evade the recognized limitations on the type of subject matter eligible
for patent protection”).
116. See, e.g., Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (asserting that system and method claims that contain the same “meaningful
limitations” should be analyzed the same way for eligibility); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“As the Supreme Court has
explained, the form of the claims should not trump basic issues of patentability.” (first citing Flook, 437
U.S. at 593; and then citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012))); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Regardless
of what statutory category (‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,’) a claim’s
language is crafted to literally invoke, we look to the underlying invention for patent eligibility
purposes.” (citation omitted)); id. at 1375 (“[T]he basic character of a process claim . . . is not changed
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Court,117 the antiformalist corollary has become an article of faith, invoked to justify
both restrictive and permissive approaches to the eligibility inquiry. If anything, it
has taken on greater force with age. In the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in CLS
Bank, Judge Lourie’s concurring opinion frequently sounded the antiformalist
alarm; it became the centerpiece of his unitary approach to the system, process, and
media claims at issue. He asserted that
[T]he cases repeatedly caution against overly formalistic approaches to
subject-matter eligibility that invite manipulation by patent applicants.
Allowing the determination of patent eligibility to “depend simply on the
draftsman’s art . . . would ill serve the principles underlying the prohibition
against patents for ‘ideas’ or phenomena of nature.” Flook, 437 U.S. at 593.
Thus, claim-drafting strategies that attempt to circumvent the basic
exceptions to § 101 using, for example, highly stylized language, hollow
field-of-use limitations, or the recitation of token post-solution activity
should not be credited.118
Elsewhere, Judge Lourie queried whether a claim to a software-related invention
drafted in system format might be a mere “Trojan horse designed to enable abstract
claims to slide through the screen of patent eligibility.”119 His approach echoed that
of the CLS Bank panel opinion, which had ruled that “[w]hile the method, system,
and media claims fall within different statutory categories, the form of the claim in
this case does not change the patent eligibility analysis under § 101.”120
The Supreme Court, in turn, seemed to amplify the antiformalist rhetoric
when reviewing the Federal Circuit’s decision in Alice:
The fact that a computer “necessarily exist[s] in the physical, rather than
purely conceptual, realm,” is beside the point. There is no dispute that a
computer is a tangible system (in § 101 terms, a “machine”), or that many
computer-implemented claims are formally addressed to patent-eligible
subject matter. But if that were the end of the § 101 inquiry, an applicant
could claim any principle of the physical or social sciences by reciting a
computer system configured to implement the relevant concept. Such a
result would make the determination of patent eligibility “depend simply
on the draftsman’s art,” [citing Flook], thereby eviscerating the rule that

by claiming only its performance by computers, or by claiming the process embodied in program
instructions on a computer readable medium.”).
117. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (“[The Court’s prior] cases warn us against interpreting patent
statutes in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art’ without reference to
the ‘principles underlying the prohibition against patents for [natural laws].’” (second alteration in
original) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 593).
118. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd, 717 F.3d 1269, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609–10 (2010)).
119. Id. at 1290.
120. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd, 685 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing, inter
alia, In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979)), vacated and reh’g granted en banc, 484 F. App’x 559
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 9, 2012).
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“‘[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable,’” [citing Myriad].121
Arguably, Alice pushes the antiformalist corollary close to its logical extreme. It
encourages an eligibility analysis that need not engage overly much with the claim
language and analysis that presupposes that differences in claim format are mere
drafting tricks without any substantive significance.122 On the other hand, in Alice,
once the Court had disposed of the method claims, the Court may have perceived
little reason to take the media or system claims very seriously. The patentee had
conceded that the media claims rose or fell with the method claims.123 That left only
the system claims, and the Court briskly dealt with them by extracting and reiterating
some quotes from Judge Lourie’s opinion below.124
Other cases that favor a substantially more permissive approach to eligibility
nonetheless also rely on the antiformalist corollary. In Classen,125 Judge Rader, joined
by Judge Newman, likewise decried claim-drafting strategies designed to evade
eligibility restrictions, but they portrayed these strategies as the inevitable
unintended consequences of a restrictive approach to eligibility. Eligibility
restrictions, they argued,
usually engender a healthy dose of claim-drafting ingenuity. In almost every
instance, patent claim drafters devise new claim forms and language that
evade the subject matter exclusions. These evasions, however, add to the
cost and complexity of the patent system and may cause technology
research to shift to countries where protection is not so difficult or
expensive.126
Because “careful claim drafting or new claim forms” could be employed to
circumvent eligibility restrictions, eligibility could become “a game where lawyers
learn ingenious ways to recast technology in terms that satisfy eligibility
concerns.”127 The judges considered the Beauregard claim directed to computerreadable media to be one illustrative result of such a game.128 They also invoked a
121. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358–59 (2014) (first citation
omitted).
122. Id. at 2360 (concluding summarily that “the system claims are no different from the method
claims in substance”).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Rader, C.J., additional views).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. As the judges explained it:
The Beauregard claim was devised to draft around restrictions on software imposed in
[Benson]. Benson denied eligibility to mathematical algorithms, a category broad enough to
endanger computer software in general. The Beauregard claim form, however, was for
“computer programs embodied in a tangible medium.” In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed.
Cir. 1995). Claims were redrafted so that the intangible computer code in Benson instead
became an encoded tangible medium in Beauregard. See id. at 1584 (PTO stating it will treat
such claims as patent eligible subject matter); MPEP § 2106 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010) (same).
Classen, 659 F.3d at 1074 (majority opinion).

Janis_production read v3 (clean) (Do Not Delete)

2015]

EXPRESSIVE ELIGIBILITY

3/13/2016 6:54 PM

995

European example: the Swiss second medical use claim form.129 Judges Rader and
Newman saw substantial downside in claim-drafting “games,” as they made
abundantly clear:
When careful claim drafting or new claim formats avoid eligibility
restrictions, the doctrine becomes very hollow. Excluding categories of
subject matter from the patent system achieves no substantive
improvement in the patent landscape. Yet, these language games impose
high costs on patent prosecution and litigation. At the same time, the new
games can cheat naïve inventors out of their inventions due to poor claim
drafting. Moreover, our national innovation policy takes on characteristics
of rewarding gamesmanship.130
Thus, according to this line of reasoning, eligibility restrictions should be avoided to
foreclose the possibility that these formalist drafting games would emerge.
Like the judges on both sides of this debate, we have little doubt that eligibility
rulings have spawned creative claiming practices. But we wonder whether there’s a
missed opportunity lurking here, one that the professions of obedience to the
antiformalist message have drowned out. We suggest a different route, as we detail
below.
B. Flipping the Corollary: The Role of Expressive Eligibility
Returning to the question that we posed at the outset, what is the patent
eligibility criterion intended to accomplish? We have argued that eligibility rules
might be understood as effective vessels for conveying high-level messages about
the nature of the patent right and the institutions that superintend it. But we have
largely avoided normative commitments.
We now take up a normative argument that relies on expressive eligibility:
eligibility doctrine should be crafted to express affirmative preferences about best
practices in claim drafting. That is, the Supreme Court (and the Federal Circuit)
should articulate eligibility rules for the purpose of stimulating the development of
claim-drafting norms, understanding that the heavy lifting—the actual development
and implementation of those norms—will be left to others. In particular, courts
should recognize that eligibility rules rarely have the long-term effect of excluding
large swaths of subject matter from the patent system. Instead, they trigger claim-

129. Because the European Patent Convention had deemed medical treatment methods
ineligible for patent protection, including methods for using a compound to treat a disease, patent
lawyers reframed the claims as method-of-manufacture claims. The initial use of the compound was for
manufacturing, which presented no eligibility concerns, even though the self-evident ultimate use was
for purposes of medical treatment. The European Patent Office (EPO) endorsed this strategy in Eisai/
Second Medical Indication, G05/83 O.J. (EPO Enlarged Bd. of Appeals 1984), and the Convention
was later revised, obviating the debate. European Patent Convention art. 54(5), Oct 5, 1973, (revised
Dec. 13, 2007), http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2013/e/ar54.html [http://
perma.cc/F9C5-9GWE].
130. Classen, 659 F.3d at 1074–75.
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drafting experiments131 and an eventual realignment of norms of claim-drafting
behavior, sometimes through informal mechanisms of communication among
patent practitioners, and sometimes through more formal processes that may
involve dialogue between practitioners and the PTO. Courts attuned to the
expressive dimension of eligibility should come to see eligibility rules as existing
primarily for the purpose of nudging the patent community toward preferred claimdrafting practices.
Our argument is essentially contrarian. As a first step, it requires the court to
rethink eligibility’s antiformalist corollary. Indeed, it calls for the antiformalist
corollary to be flipped entirely on its head and for courts to adopt a fundamentally
new orientation in regards to eligibility rules. Specifically, courts should not fashion
eligibility rules whose primary effect is to make claim drafting more difficult (and
costly). Courts should not create eligibility rules for the purpose of condemning
particular claim forms ex post. After all, having established a patent system that
demands that inventions be reduced to formal claims and having further elevated
the role of claims by embracing a peripheral claiming system,132 we ought to favor
patent rules that spur evolution in claim-drafting practices, rather than denigrating
those practices as invariably dubious acts of circumvention.133
In his opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc in Ariosa, Judge
Lourie seemed to express sympathy for the proposition that eligibility rules need
not presuppose that patent claim drafting is invariably a rule-avoidance strategy.
After observing that the claims at issue might have been drafted in Jepson format
in order to demonstrate more clearly what was claimed as improvement and what
was deemed to be in the prior art, Judge Lourie pondered whether a redrafted claim
would have fared any better under the eligibility analysis:
[A]gainst the accusation that such a [redrafted] claim to the invention
might be considered mere draftsmanship and thus still ineligible under
the seemingly expansive holding of Mayo, it must be said that a process,
composition of matter, article of manufacture, and machine are different
implementations of ideas, and differentiating among them in claim
drafting is a laudable professional skill, not necessarily a devious device
for avoiding prohibitions. This is true despite the Supreme Court’s
affirmance of this court in Alice, where we had held, by a 7–3 vote, that
method and media claims in inventions of the type claimed there were
essentially the same.134
131. See, e.g., Priti Deka Phukan, Patenting Proteins After Myriad, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 619, 644–45
(2014) (arguing that patent lawyers should draft claims directed to methods of using or making synthetic
proteins and exploring the potential use of product-by-process claims).
132. But see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743 (2009) (arguing that the peripheral claiming system has failed and
could be improved by injecting at least some elements of central claiming).
133. Moreover, patent eligibility analysis is more deeply intertwined with claim construction
than the leading judicial opinions admit. See Holbrook & Janis, supra note 20, at 363–77 (exploring this
point).
134. Ariosa, slip. op. at 6 (Lourie, J., concurring). Judge Dyke in concurrence also suggests that
claim drafting is relevant in the eligibility analysis: “so long as a claim is narrowly tailored to what the
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Discarding (or, better yet, inverting) the antiformalist corollary would be a
good first step, but courts should attempt to go further by signaling their general
preferences for claiming approaches (perhaps even claiming safe harbors) in
specified technology areas.135 The Supreme Court could take up this task if it
continues its practice of frequent interventions into the law of patent eligibility. But
if Supreme Court involvement abates, the Federal Circuit ought to be wellpositioned to reorient eligibility rules in a way that recognizes the need to facilitate
the generation of claim-drafting norms, and the patent practice community, working
in collaboration with the PTO, should be capable of articulating and propagating
those norms.
Scholars who have proposed and studied the focal-point theory—that legal
rules can be used as a focal point to express preferences about the eventual
generation of new behavioral norms—have identified conditions under which
stable norms are most likely to develop. They consider whether there are parties or
institutions in place that are capable of serving as norm entrepreneurs.136 They
examine whether there exists a coordinated community through which the norm
can be propagated and sufficiently publicized and strengthened through network
effects.137 And, they consider the extent to which a given norm is utility-enhancing
such that it stands a chance of being adopted voluntarily.138
Judge-made eligibility rules could be shaped with an eye toward supplying such
a focal point. Patent practitioners and the PTO have frequently convened to
develop norms of practice in connection with particular patentability doctrines.139
We suspect that the patent community is a coordinated community of the sort
thought to be capable of propagating those norms.
But the current orientation of eligibility law—as a gatekeeper doctrine
designed to fend off creative claiming practices—makes it difficult for norm
generation to occur. Consider the struggles among patent practitioners and the PTO
to arrive at a consensus on claim-drafting approaches that avoid the naturalproducts exception in the wake of Myriad. The initial incarnation of the PTO’s postpatent applicant has actually invented and reduced to practice, there is limited risk of undue
preemption of the underlying idea.” Id. at 22 (Dyke, J., concurring).
135. Consider a strong form of this argument: what if the decision in Myriad had been framed
more explicitly as a referendum on the use of the term “isolated” as a potential safe harbor for claiming
products derived from natural substances? Rather than focusing on the imponderable inquiry into
whether isolation constitutes human intervention that transforms gDNA into something not natural as
a matter of scientific fact, the Court could have seen its job as signaling whether the term “isolated”
ought to be understood as a patent law code word for “not the natural entity.” Such an analysis has the
virtue of bringing the eligibility analysis into the realm of construction, in which the Court can more
meaningfully draw on its expertise.
136. Dombalagian, supra note 19, at 498.
137. Id. at 495–96.
138. Id. at 496 (stating that a norm must establish a “stable, welfare-enhancing equilibrium
around which members of a community are able to coordinate their behavior”).
139. Consider, for example, the Guidelines for the Examination of Applications for Compliance with the
Utility Requirement in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (2014), developed over a decade ago after
extensive consultation between the PTO and practitioners in the chemical and biotechnology areas.
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Myriad guidance memorandum140 well illustrates the disconnect between the Court’s
pronouncements on eligibility and practical implementation in the course of day-today claim drafting. According to the memorandum, to apply the natural-products
exception to eligibility after Myriad, examiners encountering suspect claims141 must
determine whether the subject matter is claimed “in a manner that is significantly
different” from the natural entity.142 The PTO instructed its examiners that in
deciding whether a claimed invention is significantly different, examiners should
consult dual lists of factors: one set composed of six factors tending to indicate the
presence of differences and another set composed of six factors tending to indicate
the absence of differences.143 According to the PTO, examiners should balance all
of these factors to make an eligibility determination for a given claim.144
Even setting aside our potential qualms about individual factors, an approach
that asks examiners to plod through a lengthy list of conflicting factors en route to
a threshold eligibility determination strikes us as inviting calamity. The factor test is
unwieldy and would be unpredictable in application, despite the fact that the
memorandum supplements the test by explaining how the test would apply to an
extensive set of specific example claims.145 Perhaps reflecting these concerns, the
PTO discarded the factors test in its December 2014 Interim Guidance. Instead, to
determine whether a claim is directed to an ineligible natural product, the 2014
Interim Guidance directs examiners to carry out an open-ended analysis to
determine whether the claimed product has “markedly different characteristics”
than the natural product.146 The Interim Guidance specifies that the range of
pertinent characteristics is not restricted to structural characteristics, but may
include functional characteristics, “and/or other properties.”147 The Guidance goes
on to provide “non-limiting examples” of the types of characteristics that may be

140. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2014 PROCEDURE FOR SUBJECT MATTER
ELIGIBILITY ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS RECITING OR INVOLVING LAWS OF NATURE/NATURAL
PRINCIPLES, NATURAL PHENOMENA, AND/OR NATURAL PRODUCTS (2014), http://
www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/myriad-mayo_guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NNN-ZUYJ?
type=pdf].
141. That is, claims that appear to implicate the natural products exception. See id. at 3.
142. Id. at 3. The PTO seems to take “significantly different” as a term of art in this context.
Elsewhere in the guidance memo, the PTO refers to the more familiar “markedly different” formulation
that traces to Funk Bros. Id. at 1. The PTO attempted to explain what it meant by “differences” as
follows: “a marked difference must be a significant difference, i.e., more than an incidental or trivial
difference.” Id. at 5. We would respectfully suggest that no one knows what that means and that this
illustrates the likely futility of “marked” or “significant” difference as a legal test.
143. Id. at 4.
144. Id. (“The examiner’s analysis should carefully consider every relevant factor and related
evidence before making a conclusion.”).
145. Id. at 5–17.
146. 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74618, 74622–
24 (Dec. 16, 2014) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (laying out the “markedly different characteristics
analysis” for claims directed to “nature-based products”).
147. Id. at 24623 n.27 (noting that this expansion beyond structural characteristics distinguishes
the 2014 Interim Guidance from its predecessor proposal).
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considered.148 While facially quite a departure from the multifactor test, the
proposed test may be equally challenging for examiners to apply.
In a sense it is hard to fault the PTO. The problem lies in the underlying
judicial approach to eligibility, which seems oblivious to the practical need for
expressing signals that guide the exercise of claim drafting.
We recognize that this strain of our argument for expressive eligibility is not a
proposal for a minor fix. Instead, we are suggesting that the ultimate objectives of
the eligibility inquiry be reconsidered, particularly the long-held view that a primary
purpose for the eligibility requirement is to serve as a gatekeeper. But the trajectory
of recent eligibility jurisprudence persuades us that a substantial reorientation is
desirable.
CONCLUSION
After its decisions in Myriad and Alice, perhaps the Supreme Court has satisfied
its appetite for developing patent eligibility doctrine. If so, it will fall mainly to the
Federal Circuit and the PTO to explain and apply the Court’s new eligibility
jurisprudence. Expressive theories of eligibility law can be useful in that endeavor.
The Court’s approach to eligibility can more readily be explained if we understand
eligibility rules as designed in large part to serve expressive goals. In addition, it
would be desirable to reorient eligibility as a mechanism for expressing preferences
as to claim-drafting practices. The antiformalist dictum resisting this role for
eligibility should be discarded.

148. Id. at 74623 (citations omitted) (identifying “biological or pharmacological functions or
activities; chemical and physical properties; phenotype, including functional and structural
characteristics; and structure and form, whether chemical, genetic or physical”). The expansive scope
of this list opens up ample room for applicants to argue marked differences in characteristics, but it
should not be read to signal likely success on those arguments. See, e.g., In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh),
750 F.3d 1333, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (rejecting applicant’s arguments as to phenotypic and genetic
differences on the ground that those differences were not specifically claimed, and seeming to suggest
that genetic similarity would trump other differences in any event); see also In re BRCA1- & BRCA2Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755, 760–61 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (rejecting the
patentee’s argument that the claimed primers differed in chemical structure and function from native
DNA).
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